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ABSTRACT 
When an application is uninstalled from a computer system, the application's deleted file 
contents are overwritten over time, depending on factors such as operating system, available 
unallocated disk space, user activity, etc. As this content decays, the ability to infer the application's 
prior presence, based on the remaining digital artifacts, becomes more difficult. Prior research 
inferring previously installed applications by matching sectors from a hard disk of interest to a 
previously constructed catalog of labeled sector hashes showed promising results. This prior work 
used a white list approach to identify relevant artifacts, resulting in no irrelevant artifacts but 
incurring the loss of some potentially useful artifacts. In this current work, we collect a more 
complete set of relevant artifacts by adapting the sequential snapshot file differencing method to 
identify and eliminate from the catalog filesystem changes which are not due to application 
installation and use. The key contribution of our work is the building of a more complete catalog 
which ultimately results in more accurate prior application inference. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Digital forensics investigations are 
limited when digital artifacts have 
intentionally or inadvertently deleted 
often 
been 
and 
partially overwritten. The current approach for 
dealing with this situation is to use forensic 
analysis tools to attempt to recover files through 
file signature matching and data structure 
analysis [l]. Another approach is to match 
individual file sectors to known content or to 
search for sub-sector strings (keywords) of 
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interest. This approach ignores the inferential 
value of combining matched sectors and strings 
from multiple source files. A partial solution to 
this problem as proposed by Jones and his 
collaborators [2] compares matched sectors to a 
catalog of known multi-file artifact sets 
associated with specific software applications, 
then computes a weighted score over those 
matched sectors. 
The approach used by Jones is limited by the 
fact that the sequential snapshot file differencing 
method used to build the application sector 
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catalog is highly restrictive in its artifact 
selection. The files chosen for inclusion in the 
catalog are restricted to files with filenames or 
file paths matching a few selected keywords 
related to the application name, i.e., a white list. 
For example, only installed files whose file paths 
contain the keyword "firefox" are used in 
constructing a sector hash database for the 
Firefox application. This approach results in the 
exclusion of sectors from certain files of interest 
whose file paths do not consist of the chosen 
keyword of interest. Jones and his collaborators, 
in their approach, produced a satisfactory result, 
but removed some number of file and sector 
artifacts which likely have inferential value. The 
need exists for a modified approach which 
produces a more complete set of artifacts for 
each application. 
In this work, we propose a method for 
generating a more complete and accurate artifact 
set for each application included in the catalog. 
This method involves accurately isolating all 
artifacts that are generated directly or indirectly 
by an application during the application's 
lifecycle. If file system changes are monitored 
during an application's life cycle, it can be 
observed that not all the changes can be linked 
to the application. For instance, some of the 
activities are from the operating system (OS), 
and some might be due to user activities not 
related to the application of interest. In order to 
create a more accurate set of artifacts associated 
with an application, we need a means of 
distinguishing between application related and 
non-application related changes on the system's 
persistent storage. In this work, we extend the 
prior sequential snapshot file differencing 
method by isolating all application related file 
system changes in order to collect a larger but 
still accurate artifact set for the catalog 
construction. This is achieved by identifying and 
eliminating non-application-related file system 
changes and related artifacts collected while 
monitoring a file system for changes caused by 
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an application's life cycle activities. In this work, 
we achieve this goal by adding a "do-nothing" 
branch to the artifact collection process. The 
"do-nothing" branch is simply a computer 
system running concurrently with the computer 
system being monitored for file system changes 
during application life cycle activities (Install , 
Open, Close, Uninstall, Close, Restart). The "do-
nothing" system is left untouched while the 
"application-run" system gets an application 
installed, used, and uninstalled. In addition to 
the already reported file differencing performed 
between base and post activity images of the 
"application-run" branch, we also perform file 
differencing between the base and post activity 
images of the "do-nothing" branch. File system 
changes which appear in both difference sets are 
deemed to be not related to the application of 
interest. These file system changes can be 
removed from consideration for use in generating 
artifacts for the specific application catalog set. 
The key contribution of our work is 
improved catalog completeness and accuracy as 
compared to the previous file differencing 
approach for catalog construction, and the 
improvement in the accuracy of application 
inference based on the more complete catalog. 
We compare our new catalog sets to those 
previously reported, and we compare the 
inferential performance of our technique using 
known ground truth test images, including 
images from the M57 Patents Scenario data set 
[3] . We show that improving the completeness 
and accuracy of the catalog will produce 
improved application inference. This work is 
relevant for law enforcement, intelligence, digital 
forensics, and user-activity profiling. 
2.RELATED WORK 
Software applications such as word 
processors, spreadsheets, web browsers, media 
players, etc. , are of interest to the digital 
forensics community as they are the instruments 
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of user and system activity. Determining a user's 
application use is an active research area because 
different types of software allow a user to 
perform certain tasks that may be of 
investigative interest, e.g., a web browser can be 
used to access illegal content, hacking tools can 
be used to illegally access a computer system, 
etc. Forensic research regarding software 
applications often deconstructs or observes the 
application software to determine how it 
operates and what digital artifacts are created, 
modified, or deleted in different scenarios. Many 
applications have been studied in this manner 
and reported publicly, for example cloud storage 
software such as Dropbox [4], anti-forensic tools 
such as SecureClean [5], various browser 
artifacts, etc., while other analysis has been 
conducted on a one-time basis or not released 
publicly for other reasons. 
Observation-based forensic analysis of 
application programs is typically implemented 
using one or both of two primary techniques: 
system monitoring and differential analysis. 
Both techniques identify system-level changes 
that an application makes during the application 
life cycle. Process Monitor [6] is a system 
monitoring tool which provides a unified view of 
the file system, Registry, and process activities. 
It determines file system and Registry changes 
using common operating system Application 
Programming Interfaces ( AP Is). Differential 
analysis is a process that compare two objects 
and reports the differences between them. The 
differential forensic analysis formula developed 
by Garfinkel [7] can be expressed as: A---------R-
-------> B. "If A and B are disk images and the 
examiner is evaluating the installation footprint 
of a new application, then R might be a list of 
files and Registry entries that are created or 
changed" [7]. The objects that can be compared 
could be disk images, memory images, files, or 
network traffic capture files. The result of the 
differential forensic analysis is the report of 
changes between the two objects, e.g., additions, 
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modifications or deletions to the file system. 
Garfinkel et al [Ibid.] authored differential 
forensic analysis tools, such as idifference.py, 
rdifference. py, idifference2. py. The idifference. py 
and idifference2.py tools take two disk images as 
input and report on the file system differences 
between them. The rdifference. py tool takes two 
offline Registry hive files as input and reports on 
the differences between them. 
Differential analysis is dependent on the 
presence and persistence of differences. When an 
application program gets uninstalled or deleted 
by the user, files associated with the application 
are deleted and the data storage areas associated 
with those files are deallocated by the file 
system. These application artifacts are now 
subject to decay or destruction because they can 
get partially or completely overwritten when the 
operating system reallocates their associated 
clusters for new data. When the deleted files 
remain intact, there are tools such as TestDisk 
[8] that can be used to recover the files. There 
are also file carving techniques [9 , 10] that can 
be used to recover partially overwritten files. 
Other work [11] studied deleted file persistence 
in digital devices and media. 
During the course of the forensic 
examination of a digital device, one goal is to 
explain what was found in the digital device, 
possibly in relation to a crime. Often a 
hypothesis is proposed to explain how a 
computer crime was committed, and analysis of 
the digital media is performed to obtain evidence 
that would support or refute such a hypothesis. 
This analysis may be intended to answer simple 
questions involving timelines or user or 
application program activities involving a digital 
device. When one aspect of a digital forensic 
examination is to infer previously deleted 
application program software on a digital device, 
current approaches and research can be grouped 
into one or more of the following categories, 
discussed in the sections that follow: string and 
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keyword searching, log analysis, file carving, 
hash-based carving, and matching. 
A simple approach that can be used to infer 
previously uninstalled applications on a 
persistent storage media is by parsing the media 
for certain strings or keywords related to the 
application program activities in a manner 
similar to that used for memory [12], registry [13] 
and network logs [14]. Tools such as EnCase [15] 
are used to search digital media for specific 
keywords without the need to parse the file 
system. The problem with this approach is that 
other information such as time stamps, file meta-
data, etc., have to be used to interpret the 
extracted keywords to determine whether 
application program activities were responsible 
for the existence of those keywords on the media. 
Another approach to infer previously 
uninstalled applications on digital media is 
analyzing log files [16] to find evidence of 
previously recorded application program 
activities. Application program activities can be 
logged by the application itself (for debugging or 
troubleshooting purpose), another interacting 
application, or the operating system. These log 
files may persist even after the application 
program has been uninstalled and may serve as 
evidence of application program activities on the 
digital device. This approach works if the desired 
log exists and has not been tampered with, but 
is less useful if such log files don't exist or have 
been corrupted or tampered with [17]. 
All the approaches described above rely on 
artifacts with human-readable content like log 
entries, keywords, etc. Research work by GG 
Richard III [18] showed that unallocated cluster 
data and non-human-readable file content may 
also indicate the prior existence of a file, e.g., an 
application program, on the storage media. File 
system references for the "deleted" files are not 
necessarily needed to retrieve the application file 
fragments from a storage media. The extraction 
of unallocated files and file fragments is known 
as file carving. File carving is the process of 
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recovering file contents from digital media 
without the help of a file system. In order to 
successfully extract complete files from a digital 
media, knowledge of the file format (e.g., file 
headers and sometimes footers) is necessary. 
Earlier file carving approaches only work with 
unfragmented file clusters which are in order. 
Advanced recent file carving approaches work 
even if the application files are made of multiple 
fragmented file clusters [19] by using cluster 
classification techniques to identify clusters 
belonging to the same file. 
When complete file recovery is not possible 
due to decay of a deleted file 's contents, a sub-
file forensics approach [20] is needed. Research 
has shown that one can prove file existence and 
hence application program activities on a digital 
device through a process called hash-based 
carving. Hash-based carving is a technique for 
detecting the presence of specific files on digital 
media by evaluating the hashes of individual 
data blocks, rather than the hashes of entire files. 
Hash-based carving has been successful [21] in 
identifying files that are fragmented, incomplete, 
or partially modified. In order for this approach 
to be used to successfully identify a specific file, 
a catalog or database of block hashes derived 
from the file of interest has to be pre-built. The 
catalog is then used to scan a test media in 
search of matching hashes. The higher the 
number of matching blocks, the higher the 
likelihood that the full file was previously present 
in the test media. 
The sector matching and aggregation 
approach, proposed by Jones [2], is a means of 
inferring the likelihood that an application was 
previously installed on a examined system by 
matching sectors on the examined system with 
known stored sectors associated with the 
multiple files from the application of interest. 
From the matched sectors, potentially probative 
sector blocks are selected and weighted using an 
inverse weighting scheme based on Term 
Frequency - Inverse Document Frequency (TF-
Page 4
  
 
 
Fig. 1. Approach Overview 
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IDF) to compute the inferential value of the 
matched sectors. The results from this technique 
were promising in that the technique was able to 
indicate past application activity even after the 
application had been uninstalled and the host 
system rebooted and used. Disk images from the 
M57 data set [3] were used to evaluate this 
approach. While the approach was able to 
identify previously uninstalled applications on 
the test images, it was determined that the 
approach could be improved. Specifically, the 
process of selecting the sectors that get stored in 
the catalog was quite coarse, relying on the 
sector belonging to files with keywords of 
interest in its filename or file path. We are 
improving this approach by implementing a 
more complete selection process to build the 
catalog. 
3. APPROACH AND 
lVIETHODOLOGY 
Our approach, summarized in Figure 1, seeks 
to improve on the technique used by Jones et al. 
Where Jones reduced noisy sectors using a 
keyword white list approach, we do so by 
eliminating sectors that are obtained from 
systems running without any activities 
associated with the application of interest. This 
is our so-called "do nothing" branch. 
Our initial catalog was built by file 
differencing multiple virtual machine disk 
images taken while installing, using, and 
uninstalling applications in a controlled 
environment. The virtual disk images obtained 
were processed to identify new, modified, or 
deleted files between snapshots during the 
application install(!) , open( 0) , close( C), 
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uninstall(U) and system reboot (R) stages as 
indicated in Figure 1. The purpose of this process 
is to extract all the forensics artifacts an 
application of interest will create on a computer 
system throughout the application's life cycle. 
Once extracted, the disk images are then 
analyzed with custom tools based on elements of 
the DFXML toolset [7] to generate a Digital 
Forensic XML (DFXML) file showing new, 
modified, or deleted files. 
In our work, we also collect artifacts 
generated when the application of interest is not 
installed to identify artifacts due to non-
application related activities ( e.g. user, other 
application, or operating system related 
activities). Rather than restrict sectors of 
interest to files with filenames or file paths 
associated with application keywords, we include 
in the catalog all file system artifacts except 
those also appearing in the do nothing branches. 
With the understanding that operating system 
activities occur simultaneously during the 
application software life cycle (i.e. install, open, 
close, uninstall and restart) , we identify those 
artifacts in order to exclude them from the final 
catalog hash database. We achieve this by 
having a "do-nothing" branch that runs 
concurrently with the "application-run" branch. 
The "application-run" branch is a sequence of 
virtual machine snapshots taken after the 
occurrence of each part of the application 
software life cycle (install(!), open( 0), close( C), 
uninstall(U) and system reboot (R)). The "do-
nothing" branch is a sequence of virtual machine 
snapshots taken from virtual machines cloned 
from the "application-run" branch and run 
undisturbed and concurrently with the 
"application-run" branch. The purpose of the 
"do-nothing" branch is to collect file system 
activities that occur without the involvement or 
influence of the application of interest. These 
collected operating system related file system 
activities, if found among file system activities 
observed in the "application-run" branch, will be 
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Fig. 2. Overview of the VM buildup procedure for "application-run" and 
"do-nothing" branches with respect to catalog creation. 
 
 
1) Build the first VM by installing the operating system 
on the VM instance, adding the appropriate service 
pack installations so that the application software 
can successfully run within the VM instances.  
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excluded, resulting is a smaller and more 
accurate artifact set associated with the 
application of interest. The procedure described 
above and further explained in the subsequent 
subsections is depicted in greater detail in Figure 
2. 
0 
Do Nothing: 
[!!] 
• Do Nothing ■ 
~ 
~ 
We have two copies of the same base 
virtual machine instance ( the two side-by-side 
boxes labeled "B"), one designated for the 
application install, use, and removal, the other 
designated for the "do-nothing" branch where 
the virtual machine (VM) is allowed to run 
concurrently with the "application-run" branch. 
The "do nothing" VM does not have the 
application of interest installed and has no user-
initiated activity. Immediately after the 
completion of each part of the application 
software life cycle, snapshots of the VMs at the 
"application-run" and "do-nothing" branches 
are taken. The VM at the "application-run" 
branch is then copied for use in the "do-nothing" 
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branch in the next part of the experiment. This 
experiment is repeated, in sequential order, going 
through the stages of the application's life cycle 
(Base-Install-Open-Close-U ninstall-Restart). 
After each action (e.g. , Install), the "application-
run" and "do-nothing" VMs are suspended and 
the respective disk images are archived for 
further processing in the next stage of the 
experiment. The "application-run" VM is cloned 
and the two VMs are set up for the next action 
( e.g. Open) with one designated for the 
"application-run" and the other designated for 
the "do-nothing" run. The next action ( e.g. 
Open) is performed in the "application-run" VM 
while the "do-nothing" VM runs undisturbed. 
These steps are repeated as depicted in Figure 2 
until all the actions in the life cycle for the 
application software are completed. At each step 
in the experiment, disk images from the 
suspended VMs are archived. The following 
subsections describe the experiment in greater 
detail. 
In this research effort, a catalog was 
created for 16 Windows applications in a 
controlled environment using virtual machine 
snapshots. These applications are the same 
applications selected in the original NIST 
Diskprinting effort [22]. The 16 applications' 
lifecycles were run in three Windows operating 
systems (Windows XP, Windows 7 32-bit, and 
Windows 7 64-bit) to generate 29 application-OS 
combinations known as diskprints. Application-
related files created during application Install, 
Open, Close, Uninstall and system Reboot were 
identified and associated sector and file 
information collected for ingestion into the 
catalog after some post-processing actions. 
3.1 Build the Vrrtual lVla.chin.e 
(VM) instances 
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2) BASE: The base VM currently named "B" is cloned, 
with one copy designated for the “application-run” 
branch and the other designated for the “do-
nothing” branch.  
3) INSTALL: The two VMs are run simultaneously. In 
the "application-run" VM, the application software 
of interest is installed while the "do-nothing" VM is 
allowed to run undisturbed for a period of time 
without user interaction of any kind. At the end of 
the application software installation, both VMs are 
suspended, the "do-nothing" VM is renamed as 
"BT" (Base-Time) and the "application-run" VM is 
renamed as "BI" (Base-Install) to reflect the current 
state of the VMs pertaining to the application life 
cycle stages.  The virtual disk images in "BT" and 
“BI” are converted into raw disk images named 
"BT.img" and "BI.img" respectively. 
4) OPEN: The VM currently named "BI" is cloned. In 
the "application-run" VM, the application software 
of interest is launched or run and used while the 
"do-nothing" VM runs undisturbed. At the end of 
the application software use, both VMs are 
suspended, the "do-nothing" VM is renamed as 
"BIT" (Base-Install-Time) and the "application-run" 
VM is renamed as "BIO" (Base-Install-Open).  The 
virtual disk images in the two VMs are converted 
into raw disk images. 
5) CLOSE: The VM currently named "BIO" is cloned. In 
the "application-run" VM, the application software 
of interest is closed or terminated while the "do-
nothing" VM runs undisturbed. At the end of the 
application software exit, both VMs are suspended 
and renamed as "BIOC" (Base-Install-Open-Close) 
and "BIOT" (Base-Install-Open-Time) respectively.  
The virtual disk images in the two VMs are 
converted into raw disk images. 
6) UNINSTALL: The VM currently named "BIOC" is 
cloned. In the "application-run" VM, the application 
software of interest is uninstalled or deleted while 
the "do-nothing" VM runs undisturbed. At the end 
of the application software uninstall, both VMs are 
suspended and renamed as "BIOCU" (Base-Install-
Open-Close-Uninstall) and "BIOCT" (Base-Install-
Open-Close-Time) respectively.  The virtual disk 
images in the two VMs are converted into raw disk 
images. 
7) RESTART: The VM currently named "BIOCU" is 
cloned. The "application-run" VM is restarted while 
the "do-nothing" VM runs undisturbed. At the end 
of the VM restart, both VMs are suspended, the 
"do-nothing" VM is renamed as "BIOCUR" (Base-
Install-Open-Close-Uninstall-Restart) and "BIOCUT" 
(Base-Install-Open-Close-Uninstall-Time) 
respectively.  The virtual disk images in the two VMs 
are converted into raw disk images. 
 
1) The virtual disk images in the generated VMs are 
converted into raw disk images. Before the 
conversion, if the virtual disk images are not flat 
(e.g., the disk is made up of differential snapshots, 
like VDisk.vmdk, VDisk-s001.vmdk, VDisk-
s002.vmdk, VDisk-s003.vmdk, etc.), the separate 
VMDK files would have to be combined into a single 
VMDK file using the VMWare’s vmware-
vdiskmanager tool as follows: 
$ vmware-vdiskmanager -r VDisk.vmdk -t 0 
BIOCUR.vmdk 
 
2) The resulting single VMDK file is then converted 
into a raw disk image file using the qemu-img tool 
as follows: 
$ qemu-img convert BIOCUR.vmdk -0 raw 
BIOCUR.img 
 
 
1) "B.img" is compared with "BI.img" to identify file 
system changes due to application software 
installation. The file system changes are stored in 
"B-BI.dfxml". 
2) "BI.img" is compared with "BIT.img" to identify file 
system changes due to the operating system in "BI" 
state running undisturbed. The file system changes 
are stored in "BI-BIT.dfxml". 
3) "BI.img" is compared with "BIO.img" to identify file 
system changes due to the specific application 
Improved Decay Tolerant Inference of ... 
@ 2019 ADFSL 
CDFSL Proceedings 2019 
3.2 Convert the VMWare 
Vl\1I)K file to a raw- image file 
3.3 Compare adjacent images 
using the idifference tool 
The next step is to compare raw disk images 
and determine file system changes that have 
occurred between adjacent images or adjacent 
states in the "application-run" or "do-nothing" 
branches. For instance, comparing "B.img" to 
"BT.img" would allow us to determine the file 
system changes that occurred when the base VM 
is allowed to run for a period of time. The file 
system changes are stored in a file named "B-
BT. dfxml". Similarly: 
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software being launched or executed and used. The 
file system changes are stored in "BI-BIO.dfxml". 
4) "BIO.img" is compared with "BIOT.img" to identify 
file system changes due to the operating system in 
"BIO" state running undisturbed. The file system 
changes are stored in "BIO-BIOT.dfxml". 
5) "BIO.img" is compared with "BIOC.img" to identify 
file system changes due to the launched or running 
application software getting terminated. The file 
system changes are stored in "BIO-BIOC.dfxml". 
6) "BIOC.img" is compared with "BIOCT.img" to 
identify file system changes due to the operating 
system in "BIOC" state running undisturbed. The file 
system changes are stored in "BIOC-BIOCT.dfxml". 
7) "BIOC.img" is compared with "BIOCU.img" to 
identify file system changes due to the application 
software getting uninstalled. The file system 
changes are stored in "BIOC-BIOCU.dfxml". 
8) "BIOCU.img" is compared with "BIOCUT.img" to 
identify file system changes due to the operating 
system in "BIOCU" state running undisturbed. The 
file system changes are stored in "BIOCU-
BIOCUT.dfxml". 
9) "BIOCU.img" is compared with "BIOCUR.img" to 
identify file system changes due to the operating 
system in "BIOCU" state getting restarted. The file 
system changes are stored in "BIOCU-
BIOCUR.dfxml". 
 
 
Fig. 3. Comparing disk images 
  $ python idifference2.py -x B-BT.dfxml B.img 
BT.img 
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These comparisons are depicted in Figure 3. 
B-Bl.dfxml ;--- ;;j·' 
', B1-BIT.dfxml 
......... _ 
BIT 
B10-BIOC.dfxml ',,, B10-BIOT.dfxml 
I ~~T I 
BIOC-BIOCU.dfxml ;-:~:r .. ~, 
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The tool used to compare two raw disk image 
files is the idifference (idifference2. py) tool [7]. 
The idifference tool is a Python program that 
compares two raw image files and reports the 
differences on the file objects that they contain. 
It reports on file system changes such as files 
deleted, files created, files moved or renamed, 
and files modified. The output is a DFXML file. 
The general command used for comparing the 
two raw image files (e.g., B.img and BT.img) is 
as follows: 
3 .4 Shrink the DFXlviL files and 
generate a JSON file containing 
digital artifu.cts 
One of the motivations of this research 
experiment is to eliminate all file system changes 
attributed to operating system or other 
application activities from the digital artifacts 
that would be ingested into the catalog database. 
For instance, "B-Bl.dfxml" supposedly 
represents file system activities due to 
application software installation. However, while 
the application software program was being 
installed, there are other file system changes 
occurring simultaneously that are actually due 
to operating system activities and not due to the 
application installation. These operating system-
related activities must be removed from our 
current data sets. 
We remove the operating-system related 
activities from "B-BI.dfxml" by comparing "B-
BI.dfxml" with "B-BT.dfxml", a dataset that 
was created from running the base VM instance 
("B.vmware") undisturbed during the same time 
that the other base VM instance was having the 
application software program installed in it. 
Upon comparing "B-Bl.dfxml" to "B-
BT.dfxml", it was observed that there are some 
file system changes common to both data sets. 
Therefore it can be assumed that the file system 
changes common to "B-Bl.dfxml" and "B-
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1) "BI-BIO.dfxml" is compared to "BI-BIT.dfxml" to 
remove common operating system related 
activities observed during the "Open" phase. This 
results in a reduced "BI-BIO.dfxml". 
2) "BIO-BIOC.dfxml" is compared to "BIO-BIOT.dfxml" 
to remove common operating system related 
activities observed during the "Close" phase. This 
results in a reduced "BIO-BIOC.dfxml". 
3) "BIOC-BIOCU.dfxml" is compared to "BIOC-
BIOCT.dfxml" to remove common operating system 
related activities observed during the "Uninstall" 
phase. This results in a reduced "BIOC-
BIOCU.dfxml". 
4) "BIOCU-BIOCUR.dfxml" is compared to "BIOCU-
BIOCUT.dfxml" to remove common operating 
system related activities observed during the 
"Restart" phase, resulting in a reduced "BIOCU-
BIOCUR.dfxml". 
Improved Decay Tolerant Inference of ... 
BT.dfxml" are due to operating system or other 
application activities in both "do-nothing" and 
"application-run" paths in this portion of the 
experiment. These common file system changes 
are not application artifacts and so are removed 
from "B-Bl.dfxml". 
Following a similar pattern as described m 
the above paragraph: 
These comparisons ultimately result in the 
reduced "application-run" DFXML files. 
After eliminating non-application-related file 
system changes from the DFXML files , we are 
left with file system activities that are assumed 
to be attributable to the application's run in the 
VM environment. The file system activities 
include file creations, file deletions, file 
renaming/ moving and other file changes. 
Upon reviewing the DFXML files, it was 
observed that the application related files were 
recorded several times among the different 
DFXML files under different categories of file 
system activities. For example, during the 
application run process for Firefox, configuration 
and usage files are created during the "Install" 
phase and modified during the "Run" phase. Due 
to these repetitions, it was decided during the 
design stage of this research effort that only file 
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creations would be considered for inclusion in the 
catalog. Another justification for this design 
choice is also due to the fact that there are file 
system changes that remain in the reduced 
DFXML files that would be not be unique to the 
specific application. For example, Windows 
event logs are modified when an application is 
installed and used. However, it is not wise to 
include the Windows event logs in the catalog as 
most application activity results in modification 
of Windows event logs. If only newly created files 
are considered for inclusion in the catalog, files 
such as windows event logs would not be 
included m the catalog. Therefore, only 
information about file creations are extracted 
from the DFXML files. Information about folder 
creations are not included for ingestion into the 
catalog because folders have a sub-sector 
footprint and so would not be useful in our 
design. 
After new file lists are extracted from the 
DFXML files , the next step is to generate sector 
hashes of the indicated files. This information is 
not available in the DFXML files. The DFXML 
files only contain file metadata such as file inode 
number, file path, filename, partition, file id, 
name type, file size, mac time, file system offset, 
image offset, byte run length, MD5 file hash, and 
SHAl file hash. Since the goal of this research 
effort is to be able to accurately infer previously 
uninstalled applications from partially 
overwritten files, the catalog needs to be built 
with sector information. A sector is the smallest 
physical storage unit on a disk and is typically 
512 or 4096 bytes in size. Therefore, in order to 
build the catalog with sector information from 
the files attributed to the application of interest, 
one would need to locate the files in the raw disk 
images and compute the block hash in 
increments of 512 or 4096 bytes (we chose 512 in 
order to be applicable to either 512 byte or 4096 
byte image sources) . The files , once located in 
the raw disk images, are broken down into blocks 
of 512-byte size, an md5 hash is computed, and 
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$ python get_sector_hashes.py {path to DFXMLs} 
{path to IMGs} {path to JSONs} Firefox19-
W7x64.json Firefox19-W7x64 
 
$ hashdb create -b 512 Chrome28-W7x64.hdb 
$ hashdb import Chrome28-W7x64.hdb Chrome28-
W7x64.json 
 
                                                                
1https://github.com/seunfuta/AppDetective/blob/mas
ter/get_sector_hashes.py 
$ hashdb create -b 512 W7x64.hdb 
$ hashdb ingest -r W7x64 W7x64.hdb W7x64.img 
$ hashdb subtract_hash Chrome28-W7x64.hdb 
W7x64.hdb Chrome28-noW7x64.hdb 
 
$ hashdb add_multiple Chrome28-noW7x64.hdb 
Chrome28-W7x32.hdb … catalog.hdb 
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the resulting block hash is stored in a JSON file. 
A custom Python script is used for generating 
the JSON file containing sector and file 
information related to each application program. 
The custom Python script, named 
"get_sector_hashes.py" 1 is used to generate a 
JSON file that contains sector and file 
information belonging to the "Firefox19-W7x64" 
application diskprint in the following example: 
3. 5 Create catalog hashdb and 
ingest taggro. application 
meta.data. into it 
Once the JSON file containing the sector and 
file information is created, the next step is to 
create the catalog database into which the 
information in the JSON file is ingested. We 
chose to use the hashdb tool [22] version 3.1.0 
for the database since it was specifically designed 
for hash value storage and lookup. The hashdb 
tool is also used to create hash databases, import 
block hashes, and scan and manage block hash 
databases. 
The process of building the catalog hash 
database involves creating an empty hash 
database using the hashdb "create" command 
and ingesting the previously generated JSON file 
into it using the hashdb "import" command, as 
in the following example for the "Chrome28-
W7x64" application: 
The content of the created hash database for 
each application can be reduced further by 
removing from it data about blocks that can 
found in other non-application-related 
environments, like in a computer system with 
only the base operating system running. 
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Eliminating these common blocks reduces the 
false positive matches when the catalog hash 
database is used to scan against a test image. 
Removing the common sector information from 
the application hash database is accomplished 
using the hashdb "subtract_hash" command. 
This is accomplished by first creating a new hash 
database using the hashdb "create" command, 
ingesting sector and file information collected 
from a clean Windows 7 64-bit OS image 
("W7x64.img") into the database using the 
hashdb "ingest" command, and then using the 
hashdb "subtract hash" to remove sector 
information that this new database has in 
common with the application sector hash 
database. This series of commands is run as 
follows for the "Chrome28-W7x64" application: 
The next step is to combine all the separate 
application hash databases into a single hash 
database. This is accomplished using the hashdb 
"add_multiple" command. All twenty-nine (29) 
hash databases are combined as follows: 
3.6 Scan test image5 and generate 
JSON file containing matched 
sector information 
Once the catalog hash database has been 
built, the next step is to test it for its ability to 
infer previously uninstalled applications in test 
disk images. In this research effort, the true test 
of the improvement of our research methodology 
over the one previously proposed is to see an 
increase in the sectors captured per application, 
and an ability to infer previously uninstalled 
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$ hashdb scan_media -j e catalog.hdb test.img > 
catalog-test.match.json 
 
$ python process_matched_json.py catalog-
test.match.json 
 
• the number of sectors found per application 
• the total number of sectors in the catalog per 
application 
• the sector percentage, which is number of found 
sectors/total number of sectors per application 
• the weighted sector percentage, which 
considers the frequency of each matched sector 
among the 29 applications in the catalog 
• the number of files, based on the sectors found, 
per application 
• the total number of files in the catalog per 
application 
                                                                
2 
https://github.com/seunfuta/AppDetective/blob/master
/process_matched_json.py 
• the file percentage, which is the number of files 
with found sectors/total number of files per 
application 
• the weighted file percentage, which considers 
the fraction matched sector/total sectors for 
each matched file per application 
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applications in test images despite significant 
decay of the application's file artifacts. 
The process of scanning test images against 
the catalog hash database involves using the 
hashdb "scan media" command, which 
CDFSL Proceedings 2019 
generates information about matched blocks in a The final step in our research methodology is 
JSON file. The hashdb "scan media" command to compare the tables generated in our research 
is used as follows: work to the tables generated based on the prior 
3. 7 AnalY7£ the JSON file 
containing matched sector 
information 
The information about matched blocks, 
stored in a JSON file, is then processed to obtain 
information that demonstrates how much of a 
previously uninstalled application can be 
inferred in the scanned test raw disk images. A 
custom python script was developed to process 
the JSON file generated in the previous step. 
The python script, named 
"process_ matched _json. py"2 is used as follows: 
The output of the Python command line 
execution is a table that shows information 
about: 
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work of Jones et al. The tables are generated 
using the two catalogs scanned against identical 
test images. Identifying more sectors per 
applications known to be previously installed in 
the test images would be a sufficient initial proof 
of our hypothesis. 
4. FINDINGS AND 
ANALYSIS 
This experiment was conducted with 16 
applications m three operating systems 
environments, namely Windows XP, Windows 7 
32-bit and Windows 7 64-bit ( not every 
application was printed for every OS). Table 1 
shows the distribution of the applications 
analyzed, which were the same applications and 
operating systems used in the initial NIST 
Diskprinting effort [23]. The combination of the 
applications and operating systems resulted into 
29 applications that were used to build the 
catalog hash database. Each application was 
catalogued using a set of sequential VM 
snapshots, each snapshot capturing a slice of 
time in the software's life cycle on the system. 
The experiment, as presumed, revealed that 
there were file system changes that were 
common between disk images obtained from the 
"application-run" path of the experiment and 
those obtained from the "do-nothing" path. 
Eliminating these common file system changes 
reduced the number of files whose sectors are 
included in the catalog when compared to all 
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Table 1: NIST Diskprints 
App-OS WinXP Win7x32 Win7x64 
Advanced Keylogger X   
Chrome28 X X X 
Eraser  X  
Firefox X X X 
HxD Hex Editor  X  
Invisible Secrets X   
MS Office X X X 
Python264 X   
Safari517 X X X 
Sdelete  X X 
Thunderbird2 X   
TrueCrypt63 X   
UPX  X X 
WinRar5beta  X X 
WinZip17Pro  X X 
Wireshark  X X 
 
 
 sector %DP = sector_matches / sectors_totalDP 
 
 
 file %DP = files_found / files_totalDP 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Total hashes and files per Application Diskprint 
  Current Jones et al 
diskprint sectors files sectors files 
AdvKeylogger-WinXP 34,021 113 4,682 25 
Chrome28-W7x32 1,628,813 417 563,047 181 
Chrome28-W7x64 1,326,264 394 618,344 191 
Chrome28-WinXP 1,302,446 349 616,707 175 
eraser-W7x32 473,414 106 88,952 32 
Firefox19-W7x32 772,936 285 136,069 79 
Firefox19-W7x64 327,374 235 143,607 99 
Firefox19-WinXP 306,791 203 136,276 93 
HxD171-W7x32 16,003 35 8,005 18 
InvSecrets21-WinXP 24,593 111 1,197 18 
OfficePro2003-W7x32 3,655,215 6,322 1,435,417 2,961 
OfficePro2003-W7x64 2,735,821 1,834 1,073,253 864 
OfficePro2003-WinXP 4,707,778 9,255 1,415,905 2,967 
Python264-WinXP 110,556 4,427 47,062 2,035 
Safari157-W7x32 1,068,187 2,975 407,531 1,434 
Safari157-W7x64 847,899 1,736 301,256 806 
Safari157-WinXP 1,015,377 2,252 312,454 804 
sdelete-W7x32 1,740 7 249 3 
sdelete-W7x64 4,054 6 225 2 
Thunderbird2-WinXP 123,855 335 44,669 153 
TrueCrypt63-WinXP 21,750 41 9,014 15 
UPX-W7x32 3,324 17 1,340 8 
UPX-W7x64 2,260 19 798 8 
Winrar5beta-W7x32 641,637 135 9,209 41 
Winrar5beta-W7x64 36,947 107 15,311 62 
Winzip17pro-W7x32 1,449,498 355 323,735 149 
Winzip17pro-W7x64 750,663 320 283,153 149 
Wireshark-W7x32 681,631 505 102,309 237 
Wireshark-W7x64 448,605 475 129,684 223 
Total 24,519,452 33,371 8,229,460 13,832 
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differing files and sectors, but resulted in more 
files and sectors than the previous method which 
used a white list reduction approach. A review 
of the remaining files showed that they are 
unique to the "application-run" branch and thus 
true indicators of activities that are attributable 
to the application of interest. These include 
created files that can be directly linked to the 
application installation package content and 
other related file systems changes. These 
candidates are included in the catalog hash 
database. 
Table 2 shows the total sector hashes and 
files per diskprints in our catalog and in the work 
of Jones. 
The higher sector and file count per 
application in our method supports our assertion 
that this is a more complete catalog. Manual 
review of the artifact source files indicates that 
these are application related files, hence the new 
catalog has maintained accuracy as well. 
Jones used the following equations to 
compute a score based on matched sectors: 
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num_sector matches l 
weighted sector %0 p = ( ~ --) / sectors_total0 p 
S=l freqs 
num_file_matcltes matched sectors 
weighted file %0 p = ( ~ - F)/ files_total0 p 
F=l total_sectors F 
We tested our catalog using the same twelve 
(12) test images used by Jones and these scoring 
equations; the full results are presented in Tables 
4 and 5 (in the Appendix). Our catalog typically 
scored lower than the Jones catalog due to the 
fact that the Jones catalog is smaller. Total 
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Table 3: Sector and File Match Comparison between 
Methods 
  Diff (current – Jones) Diff % 
diskprint Sectors files sectors files 
AdvKeylogger-WinXP        29,339         88  627% 352% 
Chrome28-W7x32   1,065,766       236  189% 130% 
Chrome28-W7x64      707,920       203  114% 106% 
Chrome28-WinXP      685,739       174  111% 99% 
eraser-W7x32      384,462         74  432% 231% 
Firefox19-W7x32      636,867       206  468% 261% 
Firefox19-W7x64      183,767       136  128% 137% 
Firefox19-WinXP      170,515       110  125% 118% 
HxD171-W7x32          7,998         17  100% 94% 
InvSecrets21-WinXP        23,396         93  1955% 517% 
OfficePro2003-W7x32   2,219,798    3,361  155% 114% 
OfficePro2003-W7x64   1,662,568       970  155% 112% 
OfficePro2003-WinXP   3,291,873    6,288  232% 212% 
Python264-WinXP        63,494    2,392  135% 118% 
Safari157-W7x32      660,656    1,541  162% 107% 
Safari157-W7x64      546,643       930  181% 115% 
Safari157-WinXP      702,923    1,448  225% 180% 
sdelete-W7x32          1,491           4  599% 133% 
sdelete-W7x64          3,829           4  1702% 200% 
Thunderbird2-WinXP        79,186       182  177% 119% 
TrueCrypt63-WinXP        12,736         26  141% 173% 
UPX-W7x32          1,984           9  148% 113% 
UPX-W7x64          1,462         11  183% 138% 
Winrar5beta-W7x32      632,428         94  6867% 229% 
Winrar5beta-W7x64        21,636         45  141% 73% 
Winzip17pro-W7x32   1,125,763       206  348% 138% 
Winzip17pro-W7x64      467,510       171  165% 115% 
Wireshark-W7x32      579,322       268  566% 113% 
Wireshark-W7x64      318,921       252  246% 113% 
 
 
 
 
1  
 
Improved Decay Tolerant Inference of ... 
sectors ( and total files) are a denominator in 
Jones ' scoring equations, so our scores are 
usually lower even when we match more sectors. 
Given a more complete and still accurate catalog 
(no irrelevant artifacts), a better measure would 
emphasize the number of sectors ( and files) 
matched, rather than the % of total sectors or 
files. Further, our more complete catalog is 
inherently more decay tolerant, as it provides 
more sectors against which matches can be 
made. This revised scoring equation is noted as 
future work, but here we present a comparison 
of the number of sectors and files matched 
(Table 3) 
4.1 Remit of Catalog Scan against 
Test Images with Single 
Applications 
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The same five single-application test images 
used by Jones for testing their catalog hash 
database were used to test our newly built 
catalog hash database. Testing with the same 
test images would allow one to compare the two 
catalog hash databases and methodologies for 
difference in accuracy of detection. The five 
single-application test images were built using 
Chrome28, Firefox19, UPX, Winrar5beta, and 
sdelete within Windows 7 64-bit environments. 
The results of the scans, using the five images 
which contained the installation, use and 
uninstallation of a single application, show 
improvement in the number of sectors matched 
for known previously uninstalled applications. 
Table 4 (in the Appendix) shows the full results 
of the comparisons. 
4. 2 Result of Catalog Scan against 
Test Images with Multiple 
Applications 
Similarly, the same three multiple-
application test images used by Jones for testing 
their catalog hash database were used to test our 
newly built catalog hash database. Each test 
image contained the installation, use and 
uninstallation of multiple applications 
( Chrome28-Firefoxl 9, Chrome28-Firefoxl 9-
Safari517 and Winrar5beta-Winzip17pro) in 
Windows 7 64-bit environments. The test results 
show improvement in the number of sectors 
matched for known previously uninstalled 
applications. Table 5 (in the Appendix) shows 
the full results of the comparisons. 
4. 3 Result of Catalog Scan against 
M57Dataset 
The new catalog hash database was also 
tested against the M57 Patents dataset [3]. The 
M57-Patents dataset corresponds to a case 
involving four employees of a fictitious 
corporation, three of whom were involved in 
various types of criminal activity. In producing 
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the dataset, the scenario participants engaged in 
scripted and normal user activities every day for 
one month. Researchers made forensic images of 
the user workstations at the end of each day. 
Testing the catalog hash database using these 
images would help determine the ability of our 
catalog hash dataset to accurately infer the 
presence of previously uninstalled applications 
under semi-realistic conditions. Testing against 
the M57-Patents dataset also completes our 
comparison to the methodology and catalog hash 
database of Jones. 
The test images used are the final day 
snapshots of the workstations of the four 
employees, namely Charlie, Jo, Pat and Terry. 
The results from scanning the final day images 
for the four scenario users are summarized in 
Table 6 (in the Appendix). 
A review of Tables 4-6 (in the Appendix) 
shows that our methodology has resulted in more 
identified sectors and files per application known 
to be previously present on the test images. 
However, the previous approach of inferring 
application presence based on sector 
percentages, weighted sector percentages, file 
percentages and weighted file percentages does 
not take advantage of the more complete 
catalog, nor does it capture the increased decay 
tolerance of the new catalog. To demonstrate 
this point, we used our catalog to scan all of the 
M57 Pat workstation images collected over the 
one-month period and plotted the count of 
sectors associated with Advanced Keylogger over 
the time period of the scenario. Advanced 
Keylogger is malware that was installed and 
active 12/ 3 and 12/ 4, then uninstalled. Figure 4 
shows how our approach was able to identify 
considerably more sectors (308 vs 20 for the final 
image captured) associated with the Advanced 
Keylogger application program in Pat's system, 
even after uninstallation and continued system 
use. In digital forensic investigations, we 
frequently analyze systems well after the event 
has occurred. The presence of significantly more 
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sectors against which we can match may be the 
difference between whether we identify a 
previously uninstalled application or not. 
5. CONCLUSION 
In this work, we proposed a method of 
generating an application-related artifact set for 
our catalog hash database by extending the 
sequential snapshot file differencing method of 
Jones et al, adding a "do-nothing" branch to the 
collection activity. This additional process 
eliminates artifacts due to operating system and 
other application activities while retaining more 
of the relevant artifacts than the previous 
method. This provides a more decay tolerant 
catalog, although we note the need for a new 
quantitative measure of application presence 
which takes advantage of the more complete 
catalog. 
6. FUTURE WORK 
Future work involves reviewing the makeup 
of the catalog hash database to see how sectors 
that don't contribute much value to the 
application inference calculation can be 
identified and eliminated. In addition, a revised 
measure of application presence and thresholds 
using our more complete catalog needs to be 
devised. Such a measure may incorporate factors 
such as the application footprint, relative sector 
locations , artifact decay contributing factors, 
etc. We also intend to generate more test images 
to continue testing our catalog hash database. 
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Figure 4: Sector artifact persistence for Advanced Keylogger on Pat’s M57 system 
 
Table 4: Single Application Test Case Results. 
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  Chrome28-W7x64 
  Current Jones et al 
diskprintName sectors sector% w_sector% files file% w_file% sectors sector% w_sector% files file% w_file% 
Chrome28-W7x32 1,291,798 79.31% 21.95% 355 85.13% 71.26% 536,235 95.24% 31.61% 161 88.95% 76.43% 
Chrome28-W7x64 1,280,272 96.53% 27.98% 379 96.19% 85.01% 597,655 96.65% 34.03% 180 94.24% 82.29% 
Chrome28-WinXP 1,256,343 96.46% 27.81% 317 90.83% 79.86% 596,006 96.64% 33.85% 156 89.14% 77.38% 
  Firefox19-W7x64 
  Current Jones et al 
diskprintName sectors sector% w_sector% files file% w_file% sectors sector% w_sector% files file% w_file% 
Firefox19-W7x32 373,590 48.33% 15.85% 212 74.39% 61.52% 133,310 97.97% 32.12% 65 82.28% 76.06% 
Firefox19-W7x64 320,358 97.86% 32.55% 216 91.91% 79.65% 141,362 98.44% 32.81% 92 92.93% 82.90% 
Firefox19-WinXP 299,812 97.73% 32.08% 161 79.31% 68.10% 134,009 98.34% 32.38% 73 78.49% 70.60% 
  UPX-W7x64 
  Current Jones et al 
diskprintName sectors sector% w_sector% files file% w_file% sectors sector% w_sector% files file% w_file% 
UPX-W7x32 1,996 60.05% 26.08% 11 64.71% 59.52% 662 49.40% 24.68% 5 62.50% 56.81% 
UPX-W7x64 2,083 92.17% 42.21% 17 89.47% 80.26% 711 89.10% 47.58% 7 87.50% 77.07% 
  Winrar5beta-W7x64 
  Current Jones et al 
diskprintName sectors sector% w_sector% files file% w_file% sectors sector% w_sector% files file% w_file% 
Winrar5beta-W7x32 25,430 3.96% 1.69% 64 47.41% 22.49% 5,563 60.41% 30.16% 27 65.85% 36.26% 
Winrar5beta-W7x64 27,094 73.33% 41.56% 98 91.59% 64.97% 11,767 76.85% 51.02% 56 90.32% 70.31% 
  sdelete-W7x64 
  Current Jones et al 
diskprintName sectors sector% w_sector% files file% w_file% sectors sector% w_sector% files file% w_file% 
sdelete-W7x32 1,646 94.60% 39.66% 3 42.86% 42.18% 171 68.67% 34.34% 1 33.33% 30.81% 
sdelete-W7x64 4,026 99.31% 72.06% 6 100.00% 99.21% 211 93.78% 55.78% 2 100.00% 96.22% 
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Table 5: Multiple Application Test Case Results 
 
 
Table 6: M57 Patent Scenario Results 
CHARLIE Current Jones et al JO Current Jones et al 
diskprintName sectors files sectors files diskprintName sectors files sectors files 
Python264-WinXP 101,164 4,381 46,289 2,025 Python264-WinXP 101,167 4,382 46,289 2,025 
Thunderbird2-WinXP 16,848 281 8,033 129 TrueCrypt63-WinXP 17,802 15 8,680 8 
InvSecrets21-WinXP 5,096 41 1,173 12 Thunderbird2-WinXP 537 141 236 63 
Safari157-W7x64 8,001 328 2,867 127 Safari157-W7x64 7,980 332 2,857 131 
Safari157-WinXP 8,549 413 2,912 128 Safari157-WinXP 8,507 419 2,902 132 
Safari157-W7x32 8,468 434 3,125 177 Safari157-W7x32 8,471 442 3,126 182 
AdvKeylogger-WinXP 124 11 1 1 UPX-W7x32 2 2 1 1 
eraser-W7x32 157 13 31 3 UPX-W7x64 2 2 1 1 
Firefox19-WinXP 838 65 288 25 AdvKeylogger-WinXP 265 13 1 1 
Firefox19-W7x64 983 77 290 26 InvSecrets21-WinXP 132 15 0 0 
  
diskprintName sectors sector% w_sector% files file% w_file% sectors sector% w_sector% files file% w_file%
Chrome28-W7x32 876,383 53.81% 15.97% 222 53.24% 22.73% 375,906 66.76% 22.12% 102 56.35% 26.04%
Chrome28-W7x64 911,897 68.76% 20.36% 230 58.38% 26.04% 441,175 71.35% 25.42% 113 59.16% 28.25%
Chrome28-WinXP 910,660 69.92% 20.70% 198 56.73% 25.17% 441,107 71.53% 25.48% 99 56.57% 26.88%
Firefox19-W7x32 416,080 53.83% 15.89% 220 77.19% 61.25% 126,693 93.11% 30.45% 66 83.54% 76.00%
Firefox19-W7x64 289,043 88.29% 28.75% 198 84.26% 67.27% 132,776 92.46% 29.89% 85 85.86% 74.26%
Firefox19-WinXP 272,363 88.78% 29.08% 164 80.79% 67.57% 127,284 93.40% 30.70% 76 81.72% 73.56%
diskprintName sectors sector% w_sector% files file% w_file% sectors sector% w_sector% files file% w_file%
Chrome28-W7x32 242,532 14.89% 3.18% 207 49.64% 15.63% 51,827 9.20% 3.07% 94 51.93% 17.56%
Chrome28-W7x64 254,361 19.18% 4.08% 216 54.82% 18.07% 117,143 18.94% 8.08% 105 54.97% 19.77%
Chrome28-WinXP 254,186 19.52% 4.15% 188 53.87% 16.70% 117,077 18.98% 8.09% 93 53.14% 18.16%
Firefox19-W7x32 77,977 10.09% 1.61% 138 48.42% 4.71% 4,119 3.03% 1.01% 40 50.63% 3.45%
Firefox19-W7x64 10,014 3.06% 0.99% 123 52.34% 4.45% 4,297 2.99% 1.01% 48 48.48% 4.00%
Firefox19-WinXP 9,646 3.14% 1.01% 106 52.22% 4.14% 4,260 3.13% 1.06% 44 47.31% 3.75%
Safari157-W7x32 923,854 86.49% 28.83% 2,608 87.66% 81.54% 349,176 85.68% 28.55% 1,252 87.31% 82.02%
Safari157-W7x64 732,700 86.41% 28.94% 1,521 87.62% 81.73% 255,830 84.92% 28.30% 708 87.84% 82.48%
Safari157-WinXP 886,689 87.33% 29.11% 1,980 87.92% 83.12% 266,329 85.24% 28.41% 703 87.44% 82.24%
diskprintName sectors sector% w_sector% files file% w_file% sectors sector% w_sector% files file% w_file%
Winrar5beta-W7x32 4,514 0.70% 0.32% 53 39.26% 3.75% 1,993 21.64% 10.80% 23 56.10% 6.74%
Winrar5beta-W7x64 6,046 16.36% 8.05% 54 50.47% 6.46% 3,908 25.52% 12.75% 29 46.77% 6.66%
Winzip17pro-W7x32 1,104,163 76.18% 38.08% 315 88.73% 85.16% 302,247 93.36% 49.58% 141 94.63% 93.94%
Winzip17pro-W7x64 725,194 96.61% 48.36% 308 96.25% 93.34% 274,260 96.86% 48.52% 146 97.99% 96.49%
Current Jones et al
Chrome28, Firefox19-W7x64
Chrome28, Firefox19, Safari517-W7x64
 Winrar5beta, Winzip17pro-W7x64 
Jones et al
Current Jones et al
Current
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PAT Current Jones et al TERRY Current Jones et al 
diskprintName sectors files sectors files diskprintName sectors files sectors files 
Python264-WinXP 101,161 4,382 46,289 2,025 Python264-WinXP 73,755 3,958 33,091 1,814 
AdvKeylogger-WinXP 308 27 20 7 HxD171-W7x32 5,778 10 2,862 4 
HxD171-W7x32 5,398 6 2,698 3 Thunderbird2-WinXP 684 157 303 71 
Thunderbird2-WinXP 520 137 224 61 Winzip17pro-W7x64 13,209 112 6,711 53 
InvSecrets21-WinXP 124 17 0 0 Winzip17pro-W7x32 13,932 121 6,724 54 
Chrome28-W7x64 513 43 258 21 Safari157-W7x32 1,728 290 718 130 
eraser-W7x32 214 12 48 3 Safari157-W7x64 1,264 178 498 76 
Firefox19-WinXP 1,045 107 361 49 eraser-W7x32 231 15 62 3 
Firefox19-W7x64 1,187 123 364 51 Firefox19-WinXP 1,113 71 390 26 
Firefox19-W7x32 1,376 127 341 41 Safari157-WinXP 1,358 203 512 77 
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